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Abstract
As power generation by renewable sources increases, power transmission patterns over the electric grid
change. We show that due to physical laws, these new transmission patterns lead to non-intuitive grid
congestion externalities. We derive the conditions under which network externalities due to power trades
occur. Calibration shows that each additional unit of power traded between northern and western Europe
reduces transmission capacity for the southern and eastern regions by 27% per unit traded. Given such
externalities, new investments in the electric grid infrastructure cannot be made piecemeal. Power transit
fares can help finance investment in regions facing network congestion externalities.
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A robust electricity infrastructure is a key necessity for an economy. Traditionally, electric power is
mostly produced and consumed in relatively close proximity, as non-renewable power plants have been
built close to consumption to minimize transmission power losses. As an example, in the US, there are 66
balancing authorities that manage the balance of supply and demand in the regions they are responsible
for. Such co-location means that only residual power is traded over the electric grid over long distances to
ensure reliability of the power supply. However, as renewable power becomes a significant source of energy,
longer-distance transmission over the electric grid is becoming more frequent.1 Balancing supply and demand
of power in presence of inherent variability in renewable energy generation has also led to rapid increases in
inter-balancing authority power transfers that occur over longer distances. Increasing power transmission
over regions that had not traded much until now requires investments in the electric grid infrastructure.2
This paper shows that in contrast to other types of trade networks, power trade over electrical networks
face unique non-intuitive network externalities driven by physical laws (Kirchoff’s laws) that can complicate
both the placement and the cost sharing of such investment decisions. Over an electrical grid, power trade
between two regions may be constrained or facilitated due to trade between two other regions. As an example,
North-North trade of power can potentially reduce the trading capacity of South-South trade of power. The
policy implication of the network externalities discussed in this paper is that investment in electrical grids
cannot be made piecemeal where only the power generation facilities and power consumption areas are
connected with better transmission lines. Energy policymakers could potentially finance the investment
in electric grid infrastructure in regions that face externalities but not the benefits using a transit fare that
matches the magnitude of network externalities imposed.
Our paper makes two contributions. First, we derive analytical expressions to identify cases when power
trade externalities bind on other electrical grid regions. To this end, we decompose a power flow due to trades
between two nodes into flows that would exist in a network that trades any other goods and the additional
trade component due to Kirchoff’s laws. This decomposition allows us to estimate the magnitude of the
electric grid externalities due to Kirchoff’s laws as a fraction of the total power trade, which is effectively a
measure of the efficiency of a power trade. We then analyze various trade scenarios over the network for
feasibility, as network externalities due to one power trade interacts with other power trades over the network
due to physical laws. The feasibility region analysis delivers the conditions under which a power trade
1For example, areas with more solar and wind power in the center of the U.S. need to be connected to U.S. coastline load centers.
Power from the wind-rich west Texas needs to be supplied to the load centers in east Texas.
2For example, new transmission lines have been constructed to connect west and east Texas.
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reduces the network capacity for other trades. The analysis also provides conditions under which, perhaps
unintuitively, a power trade increases the network capacity for other power trades.
As the second contribution, we calibrate our analytical framework to estimate the magnitude of externality-
driven congestion constraints on the grid. Our calibration uses data from the European power grid since longer
distance power transmission over the grid is already frequent in the continent. European grid participants
have expressed concerns regarding related network externalities.3 To bring the data close to the analytical
framework, we divide the European grid into four regions.4 Our power transmission data suggests that
the European grid obtains surplus power from northern and eastern Europe. Southern and western Europe
consume this surplus. The resulting long distance transmission of power between northern and western
Europe has significant negative network externalities for the European grid. Our calibrated framework
estimates that the marginal power trade between the northern and western portions of the grid reduces grid
capacity by approximately 27% for southern and eastern Europe. The estimates are for a typical period in
Spring 2019, when the grid system did not face significant strains due to heating or cooling related spikes in
consumption.
The estimated results are for the grid at present. The increasing importance of renewable energy as
a source of power production implies that the average distance between power production facilities and
power consumption centers will keep increasing over the next few decades. This, in turn, implies that grid
congestion due to physical laws will also increase over time. Hence, our results suggest to policymakers
that as more renewable sources of energy production join the electric grid, to ameliorate potential negative
externality of longer distance power trades, new investments in the electricity grid infrastructure need to
be made. Further, these investments are required across the grid, not just between generation facilities and
consumption areas given the network externalities of power trades.
We start our analysis with a stylized framework where two power producers and consumers are connected
in a cyclic network. Without loss of generality, the producers and consumers can be thought of as net
producers and consumers. In a network that trades goods, trade between two connected parties only causes
congestion on the link between the two parties. There are no externalities in terms of congestion on other
parties.
3See “In Central Europe, Germany’s Renewable Revolution Causes Friction,” The Wall Street Journal, Feb 16, 2017. https:
//www.wsj.com/articles/in-central-europe-germanys-renewable-revolution-causes-friction-1487241180.
4The northern region includes Germany and Scandinavia in our exercise. Eastern Europe includes Central European countries
such as Poland and Hungary. Southern Europe includes includes Italy and Greece. Western Europe includes France, Spain, and
Portugal.
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However, in an electrical grid, Kirchoff’s laws dictate that power flows in a cyclic manner, i.e. even if the
North producer wishes to send power just to the North consumer, the electric circuit must close and power
flows through the cyclic network, i.e. along the Southern link as well. Thus, depending on the direction of
power flow, trade between two parties may create or ameliorate congestion on links between other producers
and consumers, in this case the Southern producer and consumer. The stylized framework allows us to
decompose the network power flow into two additive and separable terms: network flow if power were any
other good and the externality imposed on the network if the traded good is electricity.
Next, we characterize the set of feasible trades in our framework. Investigating feasibility of trades allows
us to evaluate the impact of power trade externalities on trade constraints. For a trade to be feasible, the
network flows generated must satisfy the capacity constraints of all the network edges. We derive relations
between line capacities and reactances which restrict the tradeable set.
To quantify the network externalities, we apply the analytical results obtained on data from the European
Power Grid. Along with economic integration, the electricity markets of Europe have also integrated. The
benefits of electricity market integration are similar to those of other market integrations Krugman (1979,
1980). However, our paper shows that trade between two nodes can create transmission constraints on other
lines in the grid. The northern European region has made great strides in producing renewable energy and
this energy has created large power trades over the electrical grid. Thus, Europe provides an ideal setup for
us to quantify the magnitude of power trade externalities on the electrical grid. The setup also allows us to
determine the threshold where trades become infeasible over the grid if additional power flows were to take
place.
We find that the ratio of trades on the North-North (Germany-France) line is approximately 62% more
than the South-South (Eastern Europe-Italy) line. Given the effective reactances of the grid, we first establish
that the North trade restricts the South trade. We then decompose the flows into goods flow and additional
component due to physical laws that exist in power flows. We find that the present trades reduce the
transmission capacity of the South-South line by an amount equal to 10.3% of the North-North trade. The
marginal trade between the Northern nodes reduces capacity for the southern nodes by approximately 26.9%
per unit traded.
Regarding feasibility, we find that the trade feasible set shrinks by 4% due to physical laws compared to
the case where power flows as any other commodity. Note that this calculation considers all feasible trades,
unadjusted for the probability of respective trades. In the setup calibrated for European data, we find that
3
power trades face 8.7% lower grid capacity that goods trades. This is an economically significant effect of
physical laws. These results suggest that newer investment take the network externalities into account and
expand grid transmission capacity across the network to avoid grid congestion.
Seminal work in energy economics addresses the question of appropriate price policy in regulated
industries. Specifically, how we can make sure that the price leads to the correct amount of physical capacity
of production and efficient utilization to cover the full social costs of the resources used (Steiner, 1957;
Williamson, 1966). Littlechild (1970); Crew and Kleindorfer (1971) consider the question of joint product
pricing when multiple energy producers with different cost characteristics work together to meet demand.
The aforementioned classic papers consider the problem of joint generation and pricing, but not of trades.
Our paper contributes by pointing out network externalities of power trades and the marginal cost of such
trades which can facilitate pricing of grid resources.
Significant changes have taken place in the electricity generation and transmission industry since the
1990s (Borenstein and Bushnell, 2015). Regulatory changes have allowed for a marketplace for trading power
compared to vertically integrated monopolies in the decades before. Generation of power has also become
more distributed as non-utilities have started selling power. As renewable energy becomes more feasible as
an alternative source of power, these changes that started in the 1990s have only sped up. Yet, challenges
remain in the integration of renewable energy into the grid. Edenhofer, Hirth, Knopf, Pahle, Schlmer, Schmid,
and Ueckerdt (2013) investigate the challenges in integrating renewable energy due to inherent variability in
wind and solar power production. Ko¨k, Shang, and Yc¨el (2020) consider the joint problem of investment
in renewable and conventional energy production facilities by the same firm. Qi, Liang, and Shen (2015);
Cruise, Flatley, Gibbens, and Zachary (2019) analyze the benefits of including storage along with renewable
power to attain desired production levels.
In this context, power trades over the grid provide an important method of integrating renewable energy.
However, in this case, sharing the costs of investment in renewable energy production and grid improvements
remains a difficult problem. Regarding renewable energy production, the level of subsidies provided for
renewable energy production need to be carefully determined. Cullen (2013) shows that the value of emissions
offset by wind power exceeds cost of renewable energy subsidies only if social costs of pollution are very
high. Egli, Steffen, and Schmidt (2018) suggest that costs of renewable energy production are not declining
sufficiently to make them feasible without subsidies. Regarding transmission, De Castro and Dutra (2013)
discuss the challenges in the adoption of smart grids: investments required are large and the benefits do not
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accrue to potential investors directly. Our paper provides a path forward for integrating renewable energy
into the grid: by pricing the externalities of long-distance power trades. The transit fare that we suggest can
help foster investments to improve the grid. Given that it is hard to target taxes or subsidies efficiently in the
energy markets (Allcott, Knittel, and Taubinsky, 2015), our paper contributes to reducing externality-driven
distortions in this market.
Section I provides a brief background of power flow in electric grids. Section II sets up the analytical
framework. Section III characterizes the feasible region that limits the allowable trades in the power and
goods networks. Section IV applies the analysis in previous sections, utilizes data from Europe’s electric grid
to calibrate the setup, and estimates the network congestion externalities in the European grid. Section V
concludes.
I Electric Grids: Past, Present and Future
The first electric utilities were developed in isolation of one another, granting them de facto monopolies.
These electric grids became interconnected by the end of the 1920s, and the possibility of sharing power to
meet demand across larger areas became a reality (Borbely and Kreider, 2001). Even though electric grids
were interconnected, the traditional model for electricity markets was a vertically integrated monopoly until
the 1990s. This implies that a single entity owned the entire chain of services needed to provide electricity
to customers – generation, transmission, distribution, and retail. Local utilities were responsible to set
retail tariffs, and hence these markets were regulated. However, these regulatory approaches were argued
to be inefficient, leading to slow rates of innovation and increased energy price for consumers. In 1994,
California led the reforms for the deregulation of electricity supply in the United States (Warwick, 2002). In
this deregulated model, generators compete against each other and markets are created to trade power (Ilic,
Galiana, and Fink, 1998).
The interconnection of electric grids brings reliability benefits that allow for the delivery of on-demand
electricity. In the aftermath of World War II, the need to efficiently use limited energy resources led to
an increase in the interconnection of the European national grids. This new operational paradigm allowed
countries to purchase power from each other in case of energy shortages. This paper utilizes the European
grid as a case study to analyze the implications of the interconnection of electric grids as the supply and
demand patterns shift due to increasing renewable penetration.
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When grid infrastructures are highly interconnected, as is the case in the European grid, large amounts of
power can be transported from where it can be produced cheaply to centers of high demand. Achieving this,
however, is not only a technical but also an institutional challenge, as markets need to adapted for coordinated
operations across borders (Verzijlbergh, Vries, Dijkema, and Herder, 2017).
With the greater integration of renewable energy sources into the grid, the power systems of the present
and future face new challenges. There are several aspects involved in the cost of integrating more renewable
generation in the electricity mix, including the costs to connect new wind and solar power plants to the grid
and potentially expanding transmission and distribution lines; the costs to keep enough generation capacity
to balance renewable variations; and the impact new renewable generation brings to already existing power
plants (Frstenwerth, Pescia, and Litz, 2015).
II Setup
We consider a stylized setup with four nodes that form a cyclic network. In this setup, we analyze the flows
that result from trades in two different types of network: an electricity grid and a goods trade network. Our
approach helps us understand the potential negative externalities imposed when parties trade power compared
to other tradeable goods.
Analyses of power systems as economic systems use Direct Current (DC) power flow models as opposed
to the less tractable Alternating Current models (K. Purchala and Belmans, 2005). We also use a DC
power flow model. DC power flows across all transmission lines in a network can be found using a linear
transformation of the vector of power injections in each node.
We begin by presenting the optimal power flow problem in the electricity network in Section II.A.
Section II.B contrasts the power flow solution with a goods flow solution. The section shows that the
network power flow solution can be written as an additive and separable function of goods flow solution and
externalities in an electric network.
II.A The Power Flow Problem
Consider the network in Fig. 1. We assume that each node represents a region i ∈ {NW,NE,SE,SW}5 that
produces and consumes power with a potential deficit or surplus. The surplus power can be traded across
5The regions are denoted northwest (NW), northeast (NE), southeast (SE), and southwest (SW).
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the network. Trade links ` ∈ {N,E,S,W}6 connect nodes and have constrained transmission capacity C`,
limiting trades.
To illustrate the externalities imposed on the network due to power trades, we need two sets of trades.
Thus, the stylized model assumes that two nodes NW and SE produce surplus power, which is consumed
by the remaining two nodes NE and SW , respectively.7 Thus, there is a North-North (NE and NW ) and a
South-South (SW and SE) power trade over the grid in the figure.
Figure 1: Four-node network setup. Each node i ∈ {NW,NE,SE,SW} is connected to two other nodes through an
edge ` ∈ {N,E,S,W} with constrained transmission capacity C`. In the electricity network, each node i has a net power
injection qi which is positive (resp. negative) if the node is supplying power to (resp. demanding power from) the
network.
The electricity grid is designed such that the amount of power traded over the network is maximized,
conditional on the surplus and deficit of nodes:
max
q ∑ |q|
1Tq = 0
−C≤ Sq≤ C, (1)
where the first constraint ensures that the sum of surplus power injected into the grid equals the sum of
power deficit of consumer nodes. The second constraint is a budget constraint to ensure that the total power
transmitted through the network is within network capacity C. As power can flow in either direction across
the transmission lines, the inequality is on the element-wise magnitude of the flows.
The transformation matrix S is known as the shift-factor matrix (see, for example Sahraei-Ardakani and
6The links are denoted north (N), east (E), south (S), and west (W).
7A negative surplus power means a net consumption. Thus, the North-North trade can also have node NW as a net consumer and
node NE as a net producer. The same reasoning applies to the South-South trade.
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Hedman, 2017). The matrix helps determine the power flows in the network due to the power injection vector
q so that the flow dynamics obey Kirchoff’s laws. Appendix A provides a detailed explanation of how to
compute the shift-factor matrix.
II.B Power Trades and Goods Trades
To investigate the objective of the electric grid compared to a goods network, we need to estimate the effect
of network externalities on power trade. To this end, this section breaks down a power trade into the flows
that would exist in a network that trades any other good, and the additional externality-driven network flow if
the traded item is electricity. Such a decomposition of the transformation matrix allows us to understand the
relative magnitude of externality in practice.
As discussed above, we consider the North-North, South-South power trade case. Thus, the net injection
vector is q = (qN ,−qN ,qS,−qS). In other words, nodes NE and NW trade amount qN , and nodes SW and SE
trade qS units of power8. The network topology is cyclic, as shown in Figure 1. By convention, we consider
flows through each network link to be positive if they go from node NW to NE, from NE to SE, from SE to
SW , and from NW to SW . Flows are denoted negative if they flow in the opposite directions.
Goods trade case: In a network that trades goods, the resulting flows f g` through each link ` are as
follows:
fg =

f gN
f gE
f gS
f gW

=

qN
0
qS
0

=

1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0


qN
−qN
qS
−qS

. (2)
For trades that generate flows fg to be feasible, the capacity constraint of each link in the network needs to
be satisfied, that is −C≤ fg ≤ C.
Power trade case: In case of an electricity grid, the transformation matrix S that maps power injections
in each node to the flows in each line is based on Kirchoff’s Laws. Let x` represent the reactance of the
transmission line `.9 The following lemma provides the relationship between power flows over a network and
flows when the traded good is not power.
8In other words, qNW =−qNE = qN and qSE =−qSW = qS.
9The power flows are inversely proportional to the reactance of the transmission line. A line with lower reactance can transmit
more electric charge at a given voltage. Appendix A provides the relationship between power flows and shift-matrix S in general.
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Lemma 1. (Flow Decomposition) The power flows fp = Sq are such that
fp = fg+Sσ q, (3)
where fg are the flows that are generated for non-electric trades. The second term is a vector of additional
flows that arise in the case of power trades, and is given by
Sσ q =
1
∑x`

−(xN + xE + xS) −(xE + xS) −xS 0
xW xN + xW −xS 0
xW xN + xW −xS 0
xN + xE + xS xE + xS xS 0


qN
−qN
qS
−qS

(4)
Proof is in Appendix B.
As is the case for trade in goods, the absolute value of power flows over each link in the network is
bounded by the respective transmission line capacity C. For feasible goods flows, the relationship (3) can be
used to bound power flows as follows:
| fp |= | fg+Sσ q | ≤ | fg |+ | Sσ q | ≤ C+ | Sσ q | , (5)
The inequality above considers that the net injection vector q and the network capacity C are the same for
both goods trade and electricity grid cases. The upper bound shows that power flows in an electricity grid can
rise above the capacity limitations imposed by individual links of vector C, which will bind for goods trade.
This is because of the second term Sσq that is an externality determined by the power trades between all the
nodes in the network. As we discussed before and discuss further later, the externality may be positive or
negative depending on network parameters and direction of power flow.
II.C Network externality of power flows
Let these additional flows Sσq, that exist in the electricity grid but not in the goods trade network, be denoted
as σ -flows. For the same amount of trade, higher capacity of the electric network over a goods network is not
the only possible outcome due to power network externalities. The power flows in the electricity grid can
also make the capacity bounds in the transmission lines tighter than in the goods trade case. This situation
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happens when the externalities-driven σ -flows are in the same direction as the flows from the intended trades
between producer and consumer nodes.
Theorem 1 characterizes the magnitude and direction of σ -flows in the network as well as the conditions
under which the electric grid has lower trade capacity than a comparable goods network.
Theorem 1. (σ -Flows Properties) Consider a network topology as in Figure 1 and a net injection vector of
the form q = (qN ,−qN ,qS,−qS). Let f σ` be the σ -flow along the transmission line `.
(a) The σ -flows in each transmission line are equal in magnitude and given by
| f σ` |=
| xNqN + xSqS |
∑x`
∀` ∈L . (6)
(b) The direction of the σ -flows in the network is clockwise if (xNqN + xSqS)< 0, and counterclockwise
if (xNqN + xSqS)> 010.
(c) If node NW is a consumer (supplier) when node SE is a supplier (consumer), the σ -flows will lead to
a tighter bound in transmission line North if |qNqS |<
xS
xN
, and in transmission line South if |qNqS |>
xS
xN
.
Proof is in Appendix C.
The setup is of a North-North and a South-South trade. Part (a) calculates the magnitude of the externality
flow in the electric network. The magnitude discussed in part (a) and direction of the flow discussed in part
(b) depends on the relative direction of the two trades. If node NW consumes and node SE produces or vice
versa, i.e. the North-North and the South-South trade are both in the same direction, then the sigma flows
cause a negative externality and reduce network capacity.
Part (c) provides the condition under which the externality is imposed on the North-North trade or the
South-South trade. The condition is effectively the relative magnitude of trades (|xNqN | <> |xSqS|). The
theorem yields a corollary which provides a razor-edge case when the power trade network will not create an
externality.
Corollary 1. (Trade Flow Equivalence) The electricity and the goods trade grids generate the same flows if
and only if node NW is a consumer (supplier) when node SE is a supplier (consumer), and qS =− xNxS qN . In
the degenerate case with q = 0, there are no trades in the network, and thus the flows are identically zero.
10In our model, a clockwise flow direction corresponds to the nodal path NW −NE − SE − SW −NW . The reverse path is
referred as counterclockwise.
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Proof. From (3), we note the flows will be equivalent for both cases if and only if Sσq = 0. Using (6), we
find that all the σ -flows will be zero if qS =− xNxS qN . When the net injections are zero, we have a degenerate
case in which fp = fg = 0.
We note that if the conditions for flow equivalence established in Corollary 1 do not hold, then the vertical
lines of our network (`= E and `=W ) will have a tighter bound in the electricity grid case due to non-zero
σ -flows flowing through them. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Figure 2: The flows that arise due to power trades in the four-node network shown in Fig. 1 can be decomposed into
two terms: the first is equivalent to the flows that would have been generated if the trades were pairwise, and the second
term comprises extra flows of equal magnitude through each line, which we call σ -flows. Let the trades in this network
be of the form q = (qN ,−qN ,qS,−qS). The dashed diagonal line in the (qN ,qS) plane plot is given by xNqN + xSqS = 0.
As shown in Corollary 1, the flows in the power and goods networks are equivalent for all the trades on this line. The
σ -flows are clockwise (CW) if (xNqN + xSqS) < 0 and counterclockwise (CCW) otherwise. When nodes i = NW
and i = SE take different roles, that is, one is a supplier when the other one is a consumer, the σ -flows will cause
transmission line `= N to have a tighter bound (as compared to a goods network) if | qNqS |<
xS
xN
, while transmission line
`= S will be the one with a tighter bound if | qNqS |>
xS
xN
. In this figure, these regions are mapped in the (qN ,qS) space,
where the yellow striped region corresponds to transmission line `= N being tighter, while the blue region refers to
when line `= S has a tighter bound. The network illustration exemplifies the decomposition of flows for a pair of trades
(qN ,qS) in the yellow region in the fourth quadrant. The dark arrows in lines `= N and `= S refer to the component
equal to the flows that would be generated if non-power goods were traded, and the green arrows are the CCW σ -flows.
We can observe that the externalities introduced by the σ -flows are such that the transmission line `= N expands its
capacity (extra flow opposes goods flow), while line `= S has a tighter capacity (extra flow reinforces goods flow).
These externalities impose trade constraints in certain cases. The next section characterizes the feasible
sets of trades over the four-node network that we consider.
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III Power trade feasibility over a network
For a trade to be feasible, the flows it generates over the network must satisfy the capacity constraints of
all the network edges. This condition is included as a budget constraint in the trade maximization problem
expressed as equation system (1). Investigating trade feasibility allows us to evaluate the impact of power
trade externality on trade constraints. The feasible sets we will be analyzing in this problem are illustrated in
Figure 3.
III.A Feasible trades per line
The net trades are as before q = (qN ,−qN ,qS,−qS). Writing out the flows expressions (2) and (3) as a
function of the traded quantities qN and qS, we can define these feasible sets as follows. The feasible trades in
a goods network are constrained only by the line capacity CN ,CS:
FG = {(qN ,qS) | |qN | ≤CN , |qS| ≤CS} . (7)
In the case of an electric network, the line capacities have to be sufficient to not only allow the trade
between the nodes connected by the line, but also the additional power flows through the line due to trade
between other nodes in the network driven by physical laws. For example, for line `= N the feasible trades
set FP1 is determined by a function of trade qN on the line, but also by a function of a trade qS on the
South-South line:
FP1 =
{
(qN ,qS)
∣∣∣ ∣∣ f pN∣∣≤CN}={(qN ,qS) ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣(1− xN∑x`
)
qN− xS∑x` qS
∣∣∣∣≤CN} (8)
where x` represents the reactance of the transmission line `. Thus, the feasible trades set over the electric
network isFP =
⋂4
k=1FPk, where the remaining three lines are constrained by the following relations:
FP2 =
{
(qN ,qS)
∣∣∣ ∣∣ f pE ∣∣≤CE}={(qN ,qS) ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣− xN∑x` qN− xS∑x` qS
∣∣∣∣≤CE}
FP3 =
{
(qN ,qS)
∣∣∣ ∣∣ f pS ∣∣≤CS}={(qN ,qS) ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣− xN∑x` qN +
(
1− xS
∑x`
)
qS
∣∣∣∣≤CS}
FP4 =
{
(qN ,qS)
∣∣∣ ∣∣ f pW ∣∣≤CW}={(qN ,qS) ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣ xN∑x` qN + xS∑x` qS
∣∣∣∣≤CW} (9)
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Illustration of feasible regions for trades across the four-node network in Fig. 1. For a trade
to be feasible, the resulting flows must satisfy the capacity constraints of all lines in the network. If the
trades performed are pairwise, the feasible regionFG is a rectangular area, as shown in (a), which indicates
independence between the trades. For example, trades between nodes i = NW and i = NE are constrained
only by the capacity of the link which connects these nodes and not by the trades performed between the
remaining two nodes. In other words, the flows that arise due to a certain trade do not cause externalities
on the nodes that are not trading. If power trades are considered, the feasible region is modified due to
externalities that each trade causes on the feasibility of further trades. As illustrated in (b) and (c), the feasible
region for each transmission line ` in the electricity grid is given by the area between two parallel lines. For
the horizontal transmission lines, the boundaries of this region have a positive slope, as in (b), while the
feasible region for the vertical lines are bounded by parallel lines with a negative slope (c). The overall
feasible region for power trades in the network studiedFP is the intersection of the feasible regions for each
individual line. This region will be characterized in detail in Section III, where we will show that it can either
be a parallelogram or a hexagon.
Figure 3 illustrates the interaction between power flows as they affect feasible trades. If trades do not
affect each other, as is the case in a goods network, the feasible regionFG is a rectangular area, as shown
in panel (a). Thus, the magnitude of trade along the horizontal axis qN (North-North) does not affect the
magnitude of trade along the vertical axis (South-South). The only constraint in goods trade is the capacity of
the respective North-North and South-South links.
However, such trade independence is not the case with power trades. Panel (b) in Figure 3 illustrates
the implications of equations (8) and (9). The positive slope forFP1,FP3 suggests that there are positive
complimentarities in the North-North and South-South trades qN ,qS. In other words, as qN increases, the two
lines support a larger trade qS in the same direction as well. From the line equations above, we find that the
feasible setsFP1,FP3 have a positive slope m1,m3 of:
m1 =
xE + xS + xW
xS
> 1
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m3 =
xN
xN + xE + xW
< 1. (10)
Thus, the feasibility condition is driven by lines reactances xi. However, while the North-North and South-
South lines have positive complimentarities, this is not the case for the two North-South lines. FP2 andFP4
are limited by lines with negative slope:
m2 = m4 =−xNxS , (11)
Panel (c) in Figure 3 illustrates this point. In other words, the sets FP2 andFP4 are least restricted when
trades have opposite signs, i.e. when nodes NW and SW are net producers and nodes NE and SE are net
consumers or vice-versa. This in intuitive as flows have to complete the cycle.11
By comparing the feasible sets, we can find which trades are feasible in the goods case, but not in the
electricity grid ((qN ,qS) ∈FG− (FP∩FG)), and also those that are feasible in the electricity grid, but not
in a goods trade ((qN ,qS) ∈FP− (FP∩FG)). Since the power grid is composed of the four individual lines,
the final feasible setFP is the intersection of the sets discussed above. We appeal to two results in convex set
theory that are important to note in order to characterize the feasible regions of interest. First, the intersection
of an arbitrary collection of convex sets is convex. Second, for any system of simultaneous linear inequalities
and equations in n variables, the set of solutions is a convex set in Rn (Rockafellar, 1970). Based on these
two results, we state that (i) all the individual feasible sets are convex, and (ii) the intersection of those sets is
also a convex set.
Next, we determine the feasible region for trades for the stylized grid.
III.B Feasible region
We analyze an asymmetric network where the reactances of the horizontal lines are equal (i.e. xN = xS = xH)
and the reactances of the vertical lines are equal (i.e. xE = xW = xV ). The asymmetry of the network is on the
transmission line capacities, which are different from each other.
Section III.A shows that the slopes of the parallel lines that limit the feasible regionsFP2 andFP4 are
11Note that the illustrations in Figure 3 only show the shape of each feasible region, and the actual slopes and intersections of the
boundaries with the axis will vary with the network parameters. Thus, althoughFP1 andFP3 have the same shape (area within two
parallel lines with positive slope), they will not necessarily be equivalent. The same reasoning goes forFP2,FP4, andFG, with the
exception that the feasible set of goods trades will always be rectangular (the slopes of the boundary lines do not change, as the
trades are independent and do not cause externalities over other links in the network).
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(a) Indices for boundary lines (b) Indices for intersections between boundary lines
Figure 4: Illustration exemplifying a feasible set for power trades, which is given by the intersection of the
feasible trades for each transmission line. The indices for each boundary line (a) and for each intersection (b)
are used throughout our analysis in this section. The red lines correspond to the capacity limit of transmission
line ` = N. This means that any trade between the two parallel red lines generates a power flow through
line `= N which satisfies the capacity constraint of this line. Similarly, the black boundaries correspond to
the capacity constraint of the vertical line with the lowest capacity, and the blue ones refer to the constraint
imposed by line `= S. The solid lines are the boundaries representing the binding conditions with positive
flows, while the dashed lines refer to binding negative flows. Table I presents the correspondence between
boundary lines and intersection points (e.g. intersection 2 is between boundaries 2 and 4).
the same. Since the distance between the two boundaries is determined by the line capacity, the intersection
between those two sets is the set with the lower capacity. Let CV = min(CE ,CW ), thenFP2∩FP4 =FP2 if
CV =CE andFP2∩FP4 =FP4 if CV =CW . Let us denote that intersection asFPV .
To find the feasible trades of the electricity grid as a whole, we need to characterize the intersection of
the setsFP1,FPV , andFP3. Since each set is limited by two parallel lines, which correspond to when the
power flow constraints are biding, we start by finding all the intersection points between each two lines. This
gives us a total of 12 intersection points.
Let B = {1, ...,6} denote the set of indices for the boundary lines of the sets considered. Figure 4
illustrates the boundaries and their corresponding indices. The red boundaries correspond to transmission
line `= N (FP1), the black ones refer to the vertical line with the lowest capacity (FPV ), and the blue lines
limit the feasible region for `= S (FP3). In our convention, odd-numbered lines (solid lines in Figure 4) are
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Panel A: Correspondence between intersection points and boundary lines.
n ∈I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
a,b ∈B 1-3 2-4 1-4 2-3 1-5 2-6 1-6 2-5 3-5 4-6 3-6 4-5
Panel B: Intersection points between boundaries of feasible regionsFP1,FPV , andFP3
n (qN ,qS) n (qN ,qS)
1
(
CN +CV ,
(1−Xr)
Xr
CV −CN
)
2
(
−CN−CV ,− (1−Xr)Xr CV +CN
)
3
(
CN−CV ,− (1−Xr)Xr CV −CN
)
4
(
CV −CN , (1−Xr)Xr CV +CN
)
5
(
XrCS+(1−Xr)CN
1−2Xr ,
XrCN+(1−Xr)CS
1−2Xr
)
6
(−XrCS−(1−Xr)CN
1−2Xr ,
−XrCN−(1−Xr)CS
1−2Xr
)
7
(−XrCS+(1−Xr)CN
1−2Xr ,
XrCN−(1−Xr)CS
1−2Xr
)
8
(
XrCS−(1−Xr)CN
1−2Xr ,
−XrCN+(1−Xr)CS
1−2Xr
)
9
(
(1−Xr)
Xr
CV −CS,CS +CV
)
10
(
− (1−Xr)Xr CV +CS,−CS−CV
)
11
(
(1−Xr)
Xr
CV +CS,CV −CS
)
12
(
− (1−Xr)Xr CV −CS,CS−CV
)
Table I: Feasible Power Trades
the boundaries representing the binding conditions with positive flow, and even-numbered ones (dashed lines
in Figure 4) refer to binding negative flows.
For ease of exposition, let n ∈I = {1, ...,12} denote the indices corresponding to the intersection points.
The intersections a− b for lines a,b ∈B, which are equivalent to the intersections b− a, are numbered
as shown in Panel A of Table I, and illustrated in Figure 4. The expressions for the coordinates of each
intersection point are listed in Panel B of Table I, where Xr = xH2(xH+xV ) .
Notice that the intersection points in the left of Table I are the negative of those in the right. Therefore, by
symmetry, (1) if an intersection a−b with coordinates (qN ,qS) is a vertex of the polygon that limits the set of
feasible trades, then the intersection with coordinates (−qN ,−qS) will also be a vertex, (2) the feasible set
FP will be centered at the origin, and (3) if a certain boundary line is a face of the polygon that limits the
feasible trades, so is the boundary line parallel to it. Further, since the intersection of a collection of convex
sets is also a convex set, the polygon can have at most six faces, corresponding to the six boundary lines of
the setsFP1,FPV , andFP3. Note that, for this particular problem, if the polygon had more than six faces,
then it would be non-convex. We exploit that symmetry to determine which intersection points are vertices of
the feasible region for this electricity grid.
16
Theorem 2. Let the vertex Vn be the intersection point n, as presented in Table I. For a 4-node electricity
grid with xN = xS = xH and xE = xW = xV , the set of feasible power tradesFP can be classified into one of
the following 4 cases:
• Case 1: quadrilateral defined by vertices V5, V6, V7 and V8.
Network has large capacity CV on the vertical lines, and thus these constraints will never be binding.
This case occurs if the condition below is satisfied.
(
CN +CS
2CV
)2 x2H
x2V
+
(
CN−CS
2CV
)2 x2H
(xH + xV )2
≤ 1. (12)
• Case 2: quadrilateral defined by vertices V1, V2, V3 and V4.
Network has large capacity CS on the south line, whose capacity constraint will never be binding. This
case occurs if
2C2S(xH + xV )
2
x2H +2x
2
V
≥ 2C2N +4CNCV
xV
xH
+C2V
[
1+
(xH +2xV )2
x2H
]
. (13)
• Case 3: quadrilateral defined by vertices V9, V10, V11 and V12.
Network has large capacity CN on the north line, and thus the constraint on line i = N will never be
binding. This case occurs if
2C2N(xH + xV )
2
x2H +2x
2
V
≥ 2C2S +4CSCV
xV
xH
+C2V
[
1+
(xH +2xV )2
x2H
]
(14)
• Case 4: hexagon defined by vertices V1, V2, V7, V8, V9 and V10.
If none of the conditions above hold, then none of the transmission lines have a large enough capacity
relative to others. Then, the hexagon feasible region indicates that the capacity of any of the four lines
can become binding.
Proof is in Appendix D.
Figure 5 presents one example for each possible case specified in Theorem 2. The red, blue, and black
lines correspond to the individual feasible sets of the transmission line `= N, transmission line `= S, and
vertical transmission lines, respectively. By fixing the parameters of the horizontal lines and changing only
those of the vertical lines, we are able to express three out of the four possible cases. If CN >CS, those cases
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will be Cases 1, 3 and 4; if CN <CS, we may be in cases 1, 2 or 4. If CN =CS, the conditions for the second
and third cases will never hold, and we will reduce the amount of possible cases to two.12
We can also determine the intersection of the set of feasible power trades with that of feasible goods
trades. Recall that goods trades are independent of one another, in that they do not cause externalities to other
trades. For that reason, the feasible region of non-power trades is a rectangle, as presented in Figure 3, and its
vertices are Va = (−CN ,CS), Vb = (CN ,CS), Vc = (CN ,−CS), and Vd = (−CN ,−CS).
IV Challenges for the European Power Grid
As Europe has integrated politically and economically, the electricity markets of Europe have also been
integrated. The benefits of electricity market integration are similar to those of market integration in general.
Seminal work includes Krugman (1979, 1980, 1981, 1991) who show that gains from trade due to increasing
returns to scale, i.e. cost efficiency can occur even between countries with similar preferences, technology, and
factor endowments. This is applicable in the case of electricity grid in Europe where the good is homogeneous
and is traded between countries which are similar in levels of technology.
However, as we argue in this paper, electricity market integration can also lead to a unique externality.
Depending upon the direction and magnitude of power trades, the transmission capacity available for non-
trading nodes may decline. This can lead to transmission constraints on the grid, reducing or even eliminating
the gains from integrating the network. Such constraints do not bind if power trades are concentrated locally.
This is because historically, most production and consumption of power is co-located.
The introduction of renewable sources of electricity disrupts this equilibrium. Power production from
renewable sources may not be evenly distributed over the grid. For example, the northern European region
has made great strides in producing renewable energy and this energy has created large power trades over the
electrical grid. Given the confluence of these two factors, an integrated electrical grid and large power trades
over the grid, Europe provides an ideal setup for us to determine the magnitude of power trade externalities
on the electrical grid.
12The special case of a symmetric network with CN =CS and CE =CW is analyzed in Appendix E.
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(a) Case FP1 ∩FP3 ⊂FPV , with CN = 150, CV = 100, CS =
100, xH = 0.2, xV = 0.3
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(b) CaseFP1∩FPV ⊂FP3, with CN = 100, CV = 45, CS = 150,
xH = 0.2, xV = 0.1.
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(c) CaseFPV ∩FP3⊂FP1, with CN = 150, CV = 45, CS = 100,
xH = 0.2, xV = 0.1
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(d) Hexagon Case, with CN = 150, CV = 100, CS = 100, xH =
0.2, xV = 0.1
Figure 5: Illustration of the possible feasible regions for power trades as characterized in Theorem 2. In (a),
network parameters are such that the feasible set satisfies the conditions of Case 1. From this example, we
can enter Case 4 (hexagon) by decreasing the vertical reactance xV , which will decrease the slope of the red
lines and increase the slope of the blue lines. The new intersection points of these lines with the y-axis are
such that the sets intersect as shown in (d). Note that we could also have achieved this case by fixing all
parameters used in (a), except for CV , which, if decreased, would interceptFP1∩FP3 to form a hexagon.
From (d), we are led to Case 3 if the capacity CV is lowered, as depicted in (c). This change only affects the
black lines, which will become less wide. From (c), if we switch the capacity values of CN and CS, we get to
(b), which is an example of network configuration for which Case 2 holds.
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IV.A Calibration
We divide the European grid into four meaningful regions, as shown in Figure 6. Western Europe includes
France, Spain, and Portugal. The northern region includes Germany and Scandinavia in our exercise. Eastern
Europe includes countries such as Poland and Hungary. Southern Europe includes includes Italy and Greece.
We observe that nodes NE and SW in the European grid are connected, unlike our four-node model. For the
purpose of our analysis, we can eliminate this extra connection to evaluate only the remaining trades.13
Figure 6: European grid division into four nodes
The parameters of the four-node network considered comprise line reactances x` and capacities C` for
each line ` ∈ {N,E,S,W}. To estimate the reactance values, we use the publicly available data from the
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) Transparency Portal.14
The portal collects and publishes electrical generation, transportation and consumption data for Europe. The
dataset of interest is the hourly cross-border power flow data in Europe.
Power flows: We begin by picking a 50-day time period (March 12th – April 30th, 2019) with typical
amounts of cross-border trades among the European countries. This period of spring is recent and avoids
concerns that large spikes in consumption due to cooling or heating needs are driving the results. For each of
the significant regions in Figure 6, we calculate average power flows that cross the border between regions.
Kirchhoff’s law determines that, at each node i, the sum of power inflows must equal the sum of power
13Following Shi, Shawhan, Li, Tylavsky, Taber, Zimmerman, and Schulze (2012), we can remove the extra line such that the
remaining flows in the network remain the same. If the trade flows from node NE to node SW , this is done by adding a load in node
NE that consumes the flow in the extra line, and adding a generator in node SW that generates that same amount. If the trades flow in
the opposite direction, we only need to switch the position of the load and generator added.
14Available at https://transparency.entsoe.eu/transmission-domain/physicalFlow/show
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outflows. From this, we can use the average power flows computed to determine the average net injections qi
for this 50-day period in Spring 2019. The calculated values are presented in Figure 7. For the time period
considered, we note that the region containing Germany was a big power exporter.
Figure 7: Average power flows through each line and power injections in each node calculated using the
ENTSO-E data. These values are used to estimate the reactances of the four-node network.
We aim to estimate the line reactances using the power flows and injections computed. Recall that the
power flows satisfy the relation fp = Sq where the shift-factor transformation matrix S is a function of the
reactances x`, as presented in Appendix A. Let f and q denote the vectors of average power flows and net
injections calculated using the ENTSO-E data.
Effective Reactances: We calculate the effective reactances x that lead to the power flows f calculated
from data, given the net injections q also obtained from the data. To obtain effective reactances, we solve:
min
x
‖f −S(x)q‖.
We estimate that the symmetric reactance vector x = (xN ,xE ,xS,xW ) = (0.5621,0.4818,0.5621,0.4818)
approximates the power flows with error on the order of 10−5.
Line Capacities: Next, we estimate the capacities of the four lines in the network. The ENTSO-E
Transparency Portal does not provide this information. Hence, we use data from (Hutcheon and Bialek, 2013).
This dataset lists all transmission lines that cross the boundaries of the regions analyzed, along with their
capacities. Figure 8 from Hutcheon and Bialek (2013) shows that there is significant power trade over large
distances in the European grid. The red partitions are ours, based on the partition of Europe into four nodes
(Figure 6).
Assuming that all the transmission lines across two different zones are in parallel, we add the capacities
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Figure 8: Power flow data for the continental European transmission network. The set of trades derived from
this dataset are used in the analysis presented in Section IV.B.
of all lines which connect each two zones to find the equivalent capacities below:
CN = 18860MW, CE = 9796MW, CS = 8021MW, CW = 4880MW
Power Injections: The abstraction into four-subdivisions allows us to note that nodes NW (Western
Europe) and SW (Southern Europe) are net consumers. In contrast, nodes NE (Northern Europe) and SE
(Eastern Europe) are net producers.
Data from Hutcheon and Bialek (2013) further allows us to calculate net injections, qNW =−4846MW ,
qNE = 4624MW , qSE = 3042MW , qSW = −2820MW , where subscripts refer to each node in our model,
which correspond to the regions of Europe. For each region, these values are calculated as follows. First,
we add all the power flows which leave each region and, from this total outflow, we subtract the sum of all
power flows entering this region. Thus, net suppliers have a positive net injection, while net consumers have
a negative one.
We observe that these trades are close to a symmetric case, and thus can be approximated to illustrate
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a case in which Western Europe trades with Northern Europe, while Eastern Europe trades with Southern
Europe. In the discussions that follow, we consider the following approximation for the trades:
qNW =−qNE = qN =−4846+46242 MW =−4735MW
qSE =−qSW = qS = 3042+28202 MW = 2931MW
IV.B Network Congestion Externalities
Positive or negative externality: In the stylized framework, the NW node (Western Europe, including
France) is a consumer of the power produced by the NE node (Northern Europe, including Germany). At
the same time, node SE (Eastern Europe) produces power that is consumed by node SW (Southern Europe,
including Italy). Theorem 1 states that if the ratio of the trades is greater than the ratio of effective reactances,
i.e.
|qN/qS|= 1.6155> |xN/xS|= 1,
then the power flows lead to a tighter bound in transmission line `= S (lower horizontal). That is, this line is
subject to a negative externality imposed by the flows generated by the trade between the upper two nodes.
Quantifying the average externality: The externality identified above can be quantified by decomposing
the power flows using Lemma 1.
fp = fg+Sσ q
=

qN
0
qS
0

+
1
∑x`

−(xN + xE + xS) −(xE + xS) −xS 0
xW xN + xW −xS 0
xW xN + xW −xS 0
xN + xE + xS xE + xS xS 0


qN
−qN
qS
−qS

=

qN
0
qS
0

+
1
∑x`

−xNqN− xSqS
−xNqN− xSqS
−xNqN− xSqS
xNqN + xSqS

,
where the second term denotes the σ -flows characterized in Theorem 1. Using the calibrated values from
23
Section IV.A, the decomposition is as follows:
fp =

−4735
0
2931
0

+

485.7
485.7
485.7
−485.7

=

−4249.3
485.7
3416.7
−485.7

The above decomposition suggests that the σ -flows have a magnitude of 485.7 MW and they are in the
clockwise direction, which is in accordance with the characterization presented in Theorem 1 for these flows.
An illustration of the flow decomposition performed is presented in Fig. 9.
Figure 9: Power flow decomposition into goods component and clockwise σ -flows.
When both trades are performed simultaneously in the network,15 the South transmission line faces a
negative externality in the form of a cyclic clockwise flow that decreases the capacity available for nodes SE
and SW to trade. This extra flow is 485.74735 = 10.26% of the trade between nodes NW and NE.
Conversely, this clockwise flow expands the available capacity of the North transmission line, and
therefore trades between nodes NW and NE face a positive externality. This externality is in the form of a
counter-flow that has 485.72931 = 16.57% of the magnitude of the trade between nodes SE and SW .
Externality due to marginal trade: Keeping the South-South trade fixed, each unit added to the 4735
MW North-North trade increases the extra clockwise flow by 0.2692 units. This value can be found by
15Appendix H further decomposes the externality by separating the portions caused by the North-North and South-South trade if
they were individually present.
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calculating the extra flow Sσ q for the unit additional trade (qN ,qS) = (1,0). This result suggests that the
value of the transit fare should be 26.92% for additional North-North trades. The fare can be utilized to invest
in the power infrastructure in the countries represented in the Southern region.
IV.C Trade Feasibility
The previous section calculates the network externalities in Europe when large power flows take place. This
section estimates how the set of feasible trades change given that power has to obey physical laws. Using the
estimated network parameters and power trades, we can analyze the feasible region for power trades and how
it overlaps the set of feasible goods trades.
Figure 10 shows that there are trades (qN ,qS) which are feasible in the power case but not in the goods
case, and vice-versa. The area of feasible trades over the grid if electricity did not have to obey physical laws
is 4% larger than the feasible trade region for power trades. This estimate is conditional on the calibrated
parameters and suggests that we have a set contraction when we move from goods to power trades. Note that
this is a contraction in the feasible trades which does not weigh trades by probabilities. The previous section
calculates externalities by considering trades that take place.
For the set of trades as calibrated, none of the transmission capacities are binding. This is the case for the
goods and for the power trade networks. The present trade realization is in the interior of the intersection of
the feasible sets for these two cases, as shown in the left panel of Figure 10.
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Figure 10: The left panel shows the overlap of feasible set for power (red) and goods (yellow) trades. The
black dot marks the trade pair (qN ,qS) for Europe. The right panel shows the evolution of trade (qN ,qS) as
both North-North and South-South renewable power trades increase at the same rate.
Finally, use the calibrated network parameters to analyze the effect of increasing the North-North and
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the South-South trades. If both trades increase at the same rate, then the feasibility of trades will evolve as
shown in the right panel of Figure 10. Figure I.4 suggests that renewable energy production has increased
significantly in recent years, more than doubling over the last 20 years, suggesting an annual rate of 5% or
more.
Given this trend, we next try to understand when the capacity constraints will bind in the calibrated
power network. The southernmost black dot in the right panel of Figure 10 is the same as in the left panel,
corresponding to the baseline case with trades qN =−4735MW and qS = 2931MW . The trade pair (qN ,qS)
scales up by a factor α > 1. As these power trades increase at the same rate, we move towards the boundary
of the set of feasible trades. Ultimately, when the multiplying factor reaches α = 2.5, the combined trades
leave the feasible set for power trades, but they are still feasible in the goods case. This corresponds to
the northernmost black dot in the right panel of Figure 10. At this point, the power flows generated by the
trade pair (qN ,qS) = (−11837.5,7327.5) would violate the capacity constraint of the South transmission line
and thus could not be allowed. Note that the feasibility in the goods case holds for this trade pair because
|qN | <CN and |qS| <CS. However, if both trades keep increasing at the same rate, the goods trades also
become infeasible due to a capacity violation in the South line, when |qS|>CS = 8021MW .
The calculations thus show that the power trades have 8.7% lower grid capacity that goods trades, which
is an economically significant effect of physical laws. Our work suggests that newer investment can take the
network externalities into account and expand grid transmission capacity on other lines as well (in this case,
the South line) to avoid grid congestion.
To provide additional background, the trade flow on the North-North line is 8% of the production capacity
of Germany in 2019, suggesting a slack of approximately 12% on the line at present.16 The trend line of
growth of energy production suggests that the capacity constraint may be reached in approximately 2–3 years.
Thus, additional investment in the grid maybe needed relatively soon.
V Conclusion
As the production and consumption patterns of electricity change, the electric grid needs to evolve as well. As
a higher fraction of electricity is produced by renewable sources, co-location of production and consumption
16For reference, in 2019, Germany produced an average of 58,789 MW over the year, with renewable power being approximately
half of the production. See Public Net Electricity Generation in Germany 2019 https://www.ise.fraunhofer.de/content/
dam/ise/en/documents/News/0120_e_ISE_News_Electricity%20Generation_2019.pdf.
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becomes less feasible. Hence, the grid needs to routinely transport large amounts of power across the network.
Our paper shows that such power trades produce unique and potentially negative externalities that are not
present when trading other goods. Trade between one energy producer-consumer can restrict trades between
other energy producer-consumer pairs over the grid due to physical laws. We characterize the set of feasible
trades, and decompose the additional externality in power grids over trade in goods.
We apply our analysis to the European power grid and find that Europe is facing negative externalities
of power trades. For each additional unit of power traded between the Northern countries, the transmission
capacity for the Southern European grid decreases by approximately 27% of the traded power. Thus,
investment in electric grids should be done across the network and not piecemeal. A transit fare can provide
financial resources for investment to parties that are facing externalities.
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Appendix: For Review and Online Publication Only
A Shift-matrix computation
The shift-factor matrix S linearly maps the vector of power injections q to a vector of power flows f through
the transmission lines of the electricity grid. This matrix depends on the admittances of the transmission
lines and incorporates Kirchoff’s laws. To determine the elements of this matrix, we first introduce the
relationships below:
θ = B−1q (15)
f = Hθ (16)
In (15), the matrix B is the bus admittance matrix (excluding the reference bus), which relates the phase
angles θ and the power injections q. In the expression (16), H maps the phase angles in each node to the line
flows f along the transmission lines.
Let xi j be the reactance of the transmission line between nodes i and j. The elements of the bus admittance
matrix B are given by
Bii =∑
j
1
xi j
(17)
Bi j =− 1xi j , i 6= j. (18)
In case two nodes i and j are not directly connected, the terms corresponding to this pair are zero. Further, to
calculate the power flows, we eliminate the row and column of B that refer to the reference bus, so that the
matrix becomes non-singular. The phase angle-line flows relationships in (16) are given by
fi j =
θi−θ j
xi j
, (19)
where fi j is the flow from node i to node j and θi is the voltage angle in node i. Writing that for all
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transmission lines `, we find that the mapping H is given as
H(`, i) =
1
xi j
(20)
H(`, j) =− 1
xi j
(21)
H(`,m) = 0 ∀m 6= i,m 6= j. (22)
Since we are interested in the relationship between power injections and line flows, we can substitute (15)
in (16) to find our shift matrix S
f = HB−1q = Sq. (23)
Because the power can flow both ways in the line, the values in f may be positive or negative.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Let ∑x` := (xN + xE + xS + xW ). The power flows f
p
` through each link ` in the electricity grid are
fp =

f pN
f pE
f pS
f pW

=
1
∑x`

xW −(xE + xS) −xS 0
xW xN + xW −xS 0
xW xN + xW xN + xW + xE 0
xN + xE + xS xE + xS xS 0


qN
−qN
qS
−qS

=

1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0


qN
−qN
qS
−qS

+
1
∑x`

xW −∑x` −(xE + xS) −xS 0
xW xN + xW −xS 0
xW xN + xW xN + xW + xE −∑x` 0
xN + xE + xS xE + xS xS 0


qN
−qN
qS
−qS

=

f gN
f gE
f gS
f gW

+
1
∑x`

−(xN + xE + xS) −(xE + xS) −xS 0
xW xN + xW −xS 0
xW xN + xW −xS 0
xN + xE + xS xE + xS xS 0


qN
−qN
qS
−qS

= fg+Sσ q,
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which is precisely the expression presented in the lemma.
C Proof of Theorem 1
If we write out the flows Sσq, we find
Sσq =
1
∑x`

−(xN + xE + xS) −(xE + xS) −xS 0
xW xN + xW −xS 0
xW xN + xW −xS 0
xN + xE + xS xE + xS xS 0


qN
−qN
qS
−qS

=
1
∑x`

−xNqN− xSqS
−xNqN− xSqS
−xNqN− xSqS
xNqN + xSqS

. (24)
We can readily confirm that all flows are equal in magnitude. Next, we check the directions of these flows.
If (xNqN + xSqS) < 0, the first three flows will be in the positive direction, and the last one will be in the
negative direction, giving rise to a clockwise flow. When (xNqN + xSqS)> 0, the opposite happens and we
have a counterclockwise flow being generated.
For part (c), we note that the line `= N will have a tighter bound if the σ -flow f σN through that line is
positive when the goods trade flow f gN is also positive, or when they are both negative. For the positive case,
we have the conditions
−xNqN− xSqS > 0 and qN > 0. (25)
If node SE is also a supplier (qS > 0), the first condition cannot be satisfied. Then, qS must be negative and
0< qN <
xS
xN
|qS| (26)
For the negative flow case, still for `= N, the conditions are
−xNqN− xSqS < 0 and qN < 0. (27)
Here, if both qN and qS are negative, the first condition is violated. Then, we must have qS > 0 and
0< |qN |< xSxN qS. (28)
We note (26) and (28) are equivalent and can be rewritten as the inequality presented in Theorem 1(c). The
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proof for the transmission line `= S follows the same procedure as that presented for line `= N.
D Proof of Theorem 2
Due to the symmetry of the individual feasibility sets, we may turn our attention only to the intersection
points in the left side of Table I; if one of them is found to be a vertex, so is its symmetric intersection point
(right column). Let dn denote the distance of the intersection n to the origin. We can find that:
d21 = 2C
2
N−4CNCV
xV
xH
+C2V
[
1+
(xH +2xV )2
x2H
]
(29)
d23 = 2C
2
N +4CNCV
xV
xH
+C2V
[
1+
(xH +2xV )2
x2H
]
(30)
d25 =
(CN +CS)2
2
(
xH + xV
xV
)2
+
(CN−CS)2
2
(31)
d27 =
(CN−CS)2
2
(
xH + xV
xV
)2
+
(CN +CS)2
2
(32)
d29 = 2C
2
S−4CSCV
xV
xH
+C2V
[
1+
(xH +2xV )2
x2H
]
(33)
d211 = 2C
2
S +4CSCV
xV
xH
+C2V
[
1+
(xH +2xV )2
x2H
]
(34)
The distances are such that, for any choice of network parameters, d3 > d1, d11 > d9, and d5 > d7. To
determine the feasible setFP =FP1∩FPV ∩FP3, we will evaluate three distinct cases:
1. CaseFP1∩FP3 ⊂FPV :
The intersectionFP1∩FP3 is defined by the vertices V5, V6, V7 and V8. For the polygon that limitsFP
to be a quadrilateral, the boundary lines 3 and 4 must not intersectFP1∩FP3 (i.e. FP1∩FP3 ⊂FPV ).
To determine that condition, it suffices to find when line 4 is outside the circle centered in the origin
and with radius max(d5,d7) = d5 (by symmetry, the same will be true for line 3). Let
d4o =
CV
Xr
√
2
=
2CV (xH + xV )
xH
√
2
(35)
be the distance from line 4 to the origin. Then, d4o > d5 =⇒ d24o > d25 , which leads to
2C2V (xH + xV )
2
x2H
>
(CN +CS)2
2
(
xH + xV
xV
)2
+
(CN−CS)2
2
, (36)
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from which we can find the inequality condition in (12). Furthermore, it can be shown that, if we have
an equality in the above condition, then the intersections 1, 5 and 9 will coincide, which means we still
have a quadrilateral. Therefore, if (12) holds, the quadrilateral with vertices V5, V6, V7 and V8 limits the
feasibility region for power trades.
2. CaseFP1∩FPV ⊂FP3:
The intersectionFP1∩FPV is defined by the vertices V1, V2, V3 and V4. This case will happen when
lines 5 and 6 do not intersectFP1∩FPV . Similarly to the previous case, the condition is
d6o ≥max(d1,d3) = d3 =⇒ d26o ≥ d23 , (37)
where d6o is the distance from line 6 to the origin. Then, if
2C2S(xH + xV )
2
x2H +2x
2
V
≥ 2C2N +4CNCV
xV
xH
+C2V
[
1+
(xH +2xV )2
x2H
]
, (38)
the polygon that limits the setFP is the quadrilateralFP1∩FPV .
3. CaseFPV ∩FP3 ⊂FP1:
In this case,FPV ∩FP3 is limited by the quadrilateral with vertices V9, V10, V11 and V12. Further, the
feasibility set for the entire network will beFP =FPV ∩FP3 if
d2o ≥max(d9,d11) = d11 =⇒ d2o2 ≥ d211, (39)
where d2o is the distance from line 2 to the origin. That condition is equivalent to
2C2N(xH + xV )
2
x2H +2x
2
V
≥ 2C2S +4CSCV
xV
xH
+C2V
[
1+
(xH +2xV )2
x2H
]
. (40)
If none of the above conditions hold, then the setFP will be a hexagon (Case 4) delimited by the vertices
V1, V2, V7, V8 , V9 and V10, which are the intersection points of each two lines that are closer to the origin and
their symmetric points.
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E Feasible Region: Symmetric network
Consider the case of a symmetric network in which the capacities and reactances of the horizontal lines are
the same (i.e. CN =CS =CH and xN = xS = xH), and the same is true for the vertical lines (i.e. CE =CW =CV
and xE = xW = xV ). Note that this is a special case of the more general network presented in Section III.B,
and therefore we determine the feasible region in the same way.
It is straightforward to notice from (9) that the sets of feasible trades for the vertical lines E and W will be
the same. Henceforth, we denote itFPV . The coordinates for the intersections a−b between boundary lines
a,b ∈B, which are equivalent to the intersections b−a, are listed in Table E.I, where the boundaries are
numbered as in Section III.B. These intersection points can be found by setting CN =CS =CH in the values
presented in Table I. The results in Theorem 2 can be used to find the following result for the symmetric
network.
n (qN ,qS) n (qN ,qS)
1
(
CH +CV ,
(1−Xr)
Xr
CV −CH
)
2
(
−CH −CV ,− (1−Xr)Xr CV +CH
)
3
(
CH −CV ,− (1−Xr)Xr CV −CH
)
4
(
CV −CH , (1−Xr)Xr CV +CH
)
5
(
CH
1−2Xr ,
CH
1−2Xr
)
6
(
−CH
1−2Xr ,
−CH
1−2Xr
)
7 (CH ,−CH) 8 (−CH ,CH)
9
(
(1−Xr)
Xr
CV −CH ,CH +CV
)
10
(
− (1−Xr)Xr CV +2CH ,−CH −CV
)
11
(
(1−Xr)
Xr
CV +CH ,CV −CH
)
12
(
− (1−Xr)Xr CV −CH ,CH −CV
)
Table E.I: Intersection points between boundaries of feasible regionsFP1,FPV , andFP3.
Corollary 2. For a symmetric 4-node electricity grid with CN = CS = CH , xN = xS = xH , CE = CW = CV ,
and xE = xW = xV , if
CV
CH
≥ xH
xV
, (41)
then the set of feasible power trades in the network is the quadrilateral defined by the vertices V5, V6, V7 and
V8, where Vn is the intersection point n, as presented in Table E.I. If (41) does not hold, the feasible region is
the hexagon defined by the vertices V1, V2, V7, V8 , V9 and V10.
Proof is in Appendix F.
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Note that the intersections 7 and 8 lie on the line qN = −qS, and thus this realization will give rise to
trades that are equivalent to those in a goods network, as stated in Corollary 1. That means the flows in the
vertical lines will be zero and never violate the capacity constraints of these lines. Thus, these intersections
will always be within the feasible regionFPV . Further, in this scenario, the power flows that arise in lines
`= N and `= S are equal to the maximum capacity allowed in these lines; therefore, intersections 7 and 8
will always be on the boundaries of the feasible regionsFP1 andFP3 simultaneously. It follows that these
intersection points will always be vertices of FP. On the other hand, intersections 5 and 6 may removed
from the set of vertices of the polygon when the boundary lines 3 and 4 intersectFP1∩FP3, as illustrated in
Figure E.1.
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Figure E.1: Feasibility sets for power trades in a symmetric 4-node network. The red, black and blue lines
limit the setsFP1,FPV , andFP3, respectively. On the left, we have the case with CVCH >
xH
xV
, in which lines 3
and 4 do not intersectFP1∩FP3. In the center, we have the limiting case in which CVCH =
xH
xV
, and we can see
the three intersection points that coincide to become a vertex of the quadrilateral. The last figure shows the
hexagon case, with CVCH <
xH
xV
.
In the symmetric case, the feasible set for goods trades FG is a square, which can be found by the
definition of this set in (7). In this scenario, it can be observed thatFG will always be inside the feasible set
for the power trades for a large enough CV . This can be noted because, for the power trades, the boundaries
corresponding to transmission lines ` = N and ` = S will both rotate around the points (−CH ,CH) and
(CH ,−CH), as described in Appendix G. These points are the corners ofFG that are located in the second
and fourth quadrants, and they are also two of the vertices of the parallelogram defined byFP. The other
two vertices of the feasible set for power trades, located in the first (V5) and third (V6) quadrants, will always
be above and to the right (if in the first quadrant) and below and to the left (if in the third quadrant) of the
vertices of the square goods feasible set.
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F Proof of Corollary 2
We proceed similarly to the proof of Theorem 2. The distances from the intersections to the origin are
d21 = d
2
9 = 2C
2
H −4CHCV
xV
sH
+C2V
[
1+
(xH +2xV )2
x2H
]
(42)
d23 = d
2
11 = 2C
2
H +4CHCV
xV
sH
+C2V
[
1+
(xH +2xV )2
x2H
]
(43)
d25 = 2
(xH + xV )2
x2V
C2H (44)
d27 = 2C
2
H (45)
The distances are such that, for any choice of network parameters, d3 = d11 > d1 = d9 and d5 > d7.
To determine the feasible setFP =FP1∩FPV ∩FP3, let us first take the intersectionFP1∩FP3, which
is defined by the vertices V5, V6, V7 and V8. For the polygon that limitsFP to be a quadrilateral, boundary
lines 3 and 4 must not intersectFP1∩FP3 (i.e. FP1∩FP3 ⊂FPV ). To determine that condition, it suffices
to find when line 4 is outside the circle centered in the origin and with radius max(d5,d7) = d5 (by symmetry,
the same will be true for line 3). Let
d4o =
CV
Xr
√
2
=
2CV (xH + xV )
xH
√
2
(46)
be the distance from line 4 to the origin. Then,
d4o > d5 =⇒ 2CV (xH + xV )
xH
√
2
>
√
2
(xH + xV )
xV
CH =⇒ CVCH >
xH
xV
. (47)
Furthermore, it can be shown that, if we have an equality in the above condition, then the intersections 1, 5
and 9 will coincide, which means we still have a quadrilateral. Therefore, if (41) holds, the quadrilateral with
vertices V5, V6, V7 and V8 limits the feasibility region for power trades.
If that condition does not hold, lines 3 and 4 will intersectFP1∩FP3, and these boundaries become two
new faces that limit the setFP. In that scenario, d4o < d5, and thus 5 (and its symmetrical 6) will no longer
be vertices of the polygon. Because d3 = d11 > d1 = d9, the four new vertices in this case will be V1 and V9,
along with the symmetrical points V2 and V10, which completes the proof.
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G Non-Symmetric Network: From Goods to Power (and vice-versa)
From Theorem 2, we can notice the feasible set for the electricity network will fall into Case 1 for a large
enough CV . In the next result, we focus on that special case.
Corollary 3. For a 4-node electricity grid with xN = xS = xH , xE = xW = xV , and large enough capacity CV ,
the parallelogram that limitsFP is formed by rotating the individual feasible sets for the goods trades. For
slopes as in (10), the parallel boundaries limiting the power trades in:
1. transmission line `= N are a clockwise rotation of αN = arctan(1/m1) of the goods trades for the same
line, around the point (CN ,−CN) for the boundary with positive binding flow and the point (−CN ,CN)
for the one with negative binding flow;
2. transmission line ` = S are a counterclockwise rotation of αS = arctan(m3) of the goods trades for
the same line, around the point (−CS,CS) for the boundary with positive binding flow and the point
(CS,−CS) for the one with negative binding flow.
Furthermore, because of the symmetry of the reactances, the rotation angles are the same (αN = αS) and
FP→FG as xV/xH → ∞.
Proof. From (10), we observe that the slopes are
m1 = 1+2xV/xH and m3 =
1
1+2xV/xH
=
1
m1
,
which are always positive and dependent on the reactances only. The rotation angle for the first boundary
lines are taken with respect to the y-axis, and thus can be written as αN = 90◦− arctan(m1) = arctan(1/m1),
since the slope is positive. For the second pair of boundary lines, the reference is the x-axis, and thus we
have αS = arctan(m3). Since m3 = 1/m1, we can note that those angles are the same. Further, as xV/xH →∞,
m1→ ∞ and those boundary lines tend to become vertical and coincide with the boundaries of the goods
trades for that transmission line. Similarly, m3→ 0 for the same condition, and those boundary lines tend to
coincide with the horizontal boundaries of the goods trades for line `= S.
To find the fixed points in the rotations, we begin by finding all the intersection points between the
boundary lines that form the goods square set and those that form the power parallelogram set (for brevity,
they are not listed here). For each power boundary, there is only one intersection which is invariant with
38
Figure G.2: Illustration of Corollary 3 showing how the boundaries of the set of feasible power trades rotate
with respect to the boundaries of the set of feasible goods trades.
reactance changes, and thus with rotation. Therefore, only those intersections, which are presented in
Corollary 3, can be the fixed points.
The results in Corollary 3 are illustrated in Figure G.2, where the green lines correspond to the boundaries
of the feasible region for the goods trades and the grey lines intersecting the origin mark the points around
which the boundary lines rotate.
Remark 1. The intersection points that are fixed with the rotation correspond to trades that generate
equivalent flows in the electricity and the goods trade network. From Corollary 1, we observe that those are
the trades with qN =−qS for this symmetric network.
Remark 2. The intersections of the parallelogram with the square are such that, as the boundary lines for
the power trades rotate, trades in the second and fourth quadrants that would be feasible in a goods network
are not feasible in the power network. As illustrated in Figure 2, those are the quadrants in which the flows in
the lines `= N and `= S are tighter. Further, with these rotations, some trades that are not feasible in the
goods case are added in the set of feasible power trades.
The observations from the remarks above can be visualized in Figure G.3. The red lines correspond to
feasible sets for transmission line ` = N, while the blue ones refer to line ` = S. The dashed lines are the
boundaries for the goods trades and the (red and blue) solid lines represent the feasible sets for power trades.
The solid black like shows the trades that produce the same flows both in the power and in the goods networks.
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Note that the black line intersects the fixed points around which the boundary lines rotate. Furthermore, we
can observe thatFP contains some trades that are not allowed inFG, and vice-versa.
-300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300
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Figure G.3: Example of feasible sets for power (shaded) and goods trades in a 4-node network, for large
enough CV .
H Further Decomposition Of Network Externalities
Since we adopt a linear power flow model, we can use the superposition principle to verify how each
individual trade contributes to the externality. We first decompose the power flows that arise due to the 4735
MW North-North trade to find that it produces a clockwise extra flow of magnitude 1274.8 MW.
Similarly, we can decompose the power flows of the 2931 MW South-South trade, which generates a
789.1 MW counterclockwise extra flow that reduces the available capacity in the North line. Therefore, each
individual trade is causing a negative externality to the transmission line that connects the remaining two
nodes. The power flow decomposition for both trades is as below.
North-North trade: fp = fg+Sσ q =

−4735
0
0
0

+

1274.8
1274.8
1274.8
−1274.8

=

−3460.2
1274.8
1274.8
−1274.8

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South-South trade: fp = fg+Sσ q =

0
0
2931
0

+

−789.1
−789.1
−789.1
789.1

=

−789.1
−789.1
2141.9
789.1

Note that the sum of the power flows generated from both trades is indeed the total power flow calculated
previously, as per the superposition principle. From this individual analysis, we observe that the North-North
trade imposes a more significant externality than the South-South trade. As a consequence, as described
previously, the overall extra flow is clockwise and has a magnitude of 485.7MW (1274.8MW - 789.1MW).
I Renewable Energy Production in Europe over time
Figure I.4: Renewable energy generation, Europe, 1965 to 2018
Source: BP Statistical Review of Global Energy (2019) and OurWorldInData.org/renewable-
energy. Note: ‘Other renewables’ refers to renewable sources including geothermal, biomass,
waste, wave, and tidal energy.
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